This paper provides estimates for the average Rate of Occurrence of Failures, ROCOF ("failure rate"), for critical failures when also degraded failures are present. The estimation approach is exemplified with a data set from the offshore equipment reliability database "OREDA". The suggested modelling provides means to predict how maintenance tasks will affect the rate of critical failures.
INTRODUCTION
OREDA (Offshore REliability Data) 1 is a data collection programme that has been going on since the early eighties. Reliability data has been collected for some 24,000 offshore equipment units comprising approximately 33,000 failures. The project is supported by ten oil companies; AGIP, BP, Elf, Esso, Norsk Hydro, SAGA, Shell, Statoil, and Total. SINTEF has been the main contractor since 1990.
The project is now in its fourth phase ('96) . In this phase data is collected by more automatic means, and the data collection specification, and the data collection and analysis software program have been revised in this phase.
The participating oil companies use the data in the development of new oil fields and improving existing facility operation. The reliability data are typically used as input to safety and reliability analysis. Some benefits are: safer operations, increased production availability, and optimised maintenance. Analysis of reliability data is one of several key factors in choosing cost-effective solutions. Two examples recently reported, have shown that savings of about $60 millions can be achieved compared with the cost of the original design. Lately experiences and data from this project are also exchanged with the manufacturers in order for them to improve future designs.
Typical analyses where the data have been applied are: QRA, RAM, RCM, LCC and various maintenance planning assessments. A project on using the data in more advanced reliability analysis has also been undertaken by SINTEF.
The present paper describes a model where OREDA failure event data has been used to predict how maintenance tasks will affect the rate of critical failures, and it is argued that a model for the failure mechanisms should be provided. There are two obvious types of such mechanisms:
This paper is a continuation of two papers presented at ESREL 1995 4 and ESREL 1996 7 conference. The main features of this paper, apart from applying a new data set, are the focus on qualitative analysis of the data, and presentation of ideas for further work to refine the model.
2.
DATA SAMPLE
Failure classification
The data sample used in this paper origins from the OREDA III Gas turbine database 1 . In the proceeding sections some key concepts of the OREDA database are explained with a discussion of the data adoptions made in this paper.
Failure severity:
The OREDA database classifies the failure severity according to four different categories, viz.:
A critical failure is one that causes immediate and complete loss of the capability of a system of providing its output. A degradation failure is one that does not cease all function, but compromises that function. Incipient failures have no immediate effect upon function. For simplicity, we have only distinguished between critical and non-critical failures in this paper. Thus, the non-critical category contains failures classified as degraded and incipient in the OREDA III database.
Failure detection method:
In this paper we distinguish between three different types of failure detection:
À Periodic maintenance. Failure observed during a scheduled maintenance activity, e.g. periodic service, functional testing, inspection or periodic condition monitoring. À Fortuitous observation. Failure observed during casual operator checks or by production upset. À Alarm/monitoring. Failure revealed by some instrumental monitored value being exceeded, normally observed in the control room by automatic detection.
Failure mechanisms
The calculation method used in this paper distinguishes between two main failure mechanisms: À Degradation. A failure mechanism that evolves over time, and will typically develop to a critical failure in time if not corrected. À Shock. A sudden failure mechanism that is not dependent on time. A typical example of such a failure mechanism is failure of electrical components.
In Table 1 , an overview of the relationship between the OREDA III apparent failure causes (called failure descriptors) and the main failure mechanism used in this paper is presented: The classification presented in this table is a simplification, and deviation from this scheme may occur. In addition to the failure mechanisms listed in Table 1 , OREDA comprises codes related to design and operational causes. These codes do not fully fit into the scheme used here, and such events are included in the "degradation" or "shock" category according to the observed distribution between these two failure mechanisms.
Failure Data
The following data sample has been extracted from the database:
Equipment:
Gas turbines Type:
Electric generation Power: 28 MW The data sample originates from equipment units on the same installation, being of the same make and subjected to the same preventive maintenance program. This, to achieve a homogenous data sample. The number of failures in Table 2 comprises both failures on demand and failure to run. The resulting data set from the OREDA III gas turbine database is presented in Table 3 and Table 4 . The results are presented on subunit level, categorised according to the following scheme: In Table 4 , the results are further detailed by breaking down the gas turbine into a number of subunits. This is necessary to investigate failure mechanisms on a lower indenture level, and to deal with the situation where the various subsystems have individual preventive maintenance intervals. 
CALCULATION MODEL

Model Assumptions
In the following we restrict consideration to components that have the following properties:
1. Shock failures cannot occur when a component has a critical degradation failure and vice versa.
Shock failures occur with a constant rate
failures" which are critical to system performance.
5.
The MTTRs are assumed to be short and are ignored. Thus, after critical failure or failure detection, the component is immediately brought to state "OK" 6.
All shock failures are critical, failures grouped as "non-critical shock failures" are ignored. 7.
All calculations are based on operational time. Values given in surveillance years are scaled to their "corresponding" value in operating years.
Assumption 6 is based on the hypothesis that "non-critical shock failures" will not occur to lower indenture components. They appear in our data set, because the critical/non critical classification is performed on system level. Therefore, "non-critical shock failures" are a result of the system configuration, and not the failure mechanisms. As the latter is our main concern in the present paper, we discard these failures.
Assumption 7 implicitly means that in this system, all failures/degradation happens while the machinery is running. This premise can be valid for some failure causes (e.g. "vibration"), but not as appropriate for others (e.g. "corrosion").
Degradation is not assumed to be a continuos process in this system; i.e. we do not measure degree of degradation, as long as the system is degraded. Therefore, the probability of fortuitous detection of a degraded failure will not increase with time spent in the "Degradation, Non-Critical" state.
The failure model is described with a state diagram, based on Markov theory. The states should be understood as described below: The system is as good as new "Shock, Critical"
The system has failed due to a shock failure "Degradation, Non-Critical"
The system is degraded, but still functional "PM"
A non-critical failure was detected by PM "Degradation, Critical"
The system has failed due to a degradation failure "Fortuitous detection"
A non-critical failure was detected during casual operator checks or by production upset
The system states are shown in Figure 1 . 
Calculation Formulas
To establish numerical values for the transition rates, the basic assumption is that given a non-critical failure, the time to the next preventive maintenance event is on average τ/2. Here τ is the time (in operation years) between preventive maintenance actions. So, λ PM is estimated equal to 2/τ . This is not entirely correct, as the time between each PM equals τ, and the time "a degradation failure must wait to be discovered by PM personnel" is therefore uniformly distributed on [0, τ]. Hence, the exponential distribution is not really suited for this situation. However, as we only are concerned with the asymptotic results, this approximation will be good enough. The other transition rates are found directly by keeping the ratios of the transition rates equal to the corresponding ratios of the observed number of events, see the example below.
Example:
For the gas generators, the calendar time between PM is 6 months. We have a total operational time of 7.15 years and surveillance period of 11.91 years. Therefore, the PM interval (in operating years) equals 0. (5) Using this approach, all transition rates for a test period identical to that of the data set are found.
The next important assumption is that the components "internal transition rates" will not change because of a change in the preventive maintenance interval. This means that the values λ Shock , λ Degradation, NC , λ Degradation, Crit and λ Fortuitous are independent of PM intervals. Hence, the transition rates we have established for one specific preventive maintenance interval will also apply for other test intervals.
The only transition rate we will change is λ PM . The definition is as before, λ PM = 2/τ, but as the preventive maintenance interval is altered, the numerical value of λ PM is changed accordingly. Note that the equations (2) - (5) are only valid for the PM interval observed in the dataset, and used to estimate the transition rates which are independent of PM interval. When λ PM is changed, the equations will therefore not be valid.
Numerical results
We define MTTF to be the time between critical failures. By noting that the number of "cycles" the system will go through before it ends in a critical failure follows the geometric distribution, we find the results in Table 6 . The present PM intervals of the equipment are indicated as framed areas in the table. Graphical presentations of the figures in Table 6 are given in Figure 2 and Figure 3 , showing the mean time to critical failure as a function of the preventive maintenance interval for the two chosen subunits. 
Qualitative interpretations
In this section, some simple observations are made based on the data breakdown presented in Table 4 . . A high ratio may indicate that the PM program is inadequate, allowing too many failure to develop into a critical failure. Finding the optimal ratio, however, is not completely straightforward and requires that several parameters are considered, e.g. the cost of a critical failure versus the cost of PM activities.
À
The ratio of critical versus non-critical failures detected by alarm/monitoring. A high ratio may indicate that the protective instrumentation configuration is not optimal. This may be improved by changing the instrument set points or by altering the configuration.
Other observations:
1. 99% of the failures related to the control and monitoring system are caused by a shock mechanism. This is as expected as the subunit mainly comprises electronics/ instrumentation. This could be a starting point for further studies to investigate whether the PM interval could be extended.
2.
94 % of all failures related to the gas generator are caused by a degradation mechanism. This underlines the importance of preventive maintenance.
3.
For the gas generator, 33% of all failures detected by alarm/monitoring are critical. This may be an indication that the instrument configuration should be improved, e.g. by lowering the limits for activation.
FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS OF THE MODEL
Preventive maintenance (PM) induced failures
The data from OREDA IV will include the failure causes "Maintenance error" and "Operator error". In the current model, the possibility for PM induced failures are discarded, and the MTTF is strictly decreasing as τ increases. However, if estimates for failures induced during PM are added to the model, we would expect to find a "failure rate" similar to the sketch below: 
Improved estimation techniques
More sophisticated methods can be used when estimating the parameters of the model. The estimators in the current paper are based on the five components in question only. A more well-bred approach would include Bayesian estimation techniques, where the parameters' prior distributions were founded on a broader range of the data gathered within in the OREDA project. This Bayesian approach is described in further detail in 6 .
Operational time vs. Surveillance time
All calculations in the present model are based on operational time (ref. Assumption 7) . This implies that we assume that all failures are due to the operation of the equipment, and the equipment unit will not fail during standby. This is, of course, not a correct assumption, although it may be appropriate for some failure mechanisms.
Therefore, it is proposed to classify all failures in one of two groups: 1) Failures are initiated mainly during operation 2)
Failures are initiated mainly during standby/downtime
The failures within "Group 1" is properly treated with the current model. For the other fa ilures, however, a more sophisticated model based on calendar time will be necessary. This new model should be able to predict the probability for a component to fail with the "Fail to Start" failure mode after a period in standby. A "first layout" of the corresponding state diagram is displayed in Figure 5 below, which may be compared with the original model in Figure 1 .
Figure 5: Enhanced model
The extension allows critical degradation failures to be found either during PM, by a demand (resulting in a "Fail to start" failure mode) or by some other means (i.e. alarm and monitoring, fortuitous observation etc.). The main advance for this method, is that we can pinpoint the effect of PM for a component that is subject to random inspection (such as alarm/monitoring or some type of fortuitous observation).
5.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
